Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform- and Discriminatory-price Auctions

Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform- and Discriminatory-price Auctions
Author :
Publisher :
Total Pages : 17
Release :
ISBN-10 : OCLC:255261978
ISBN-13 :
Rating : 4/5 (78 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform- and Discriminatory-price Auctions by : Alexander Elbittar

Download or read book Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform- and Discriminatory-price Auctions written by Alexander Elbittar and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform- and Discriminatory-price Auctions Related Books

Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform- and Discriminatory-price Auctions
Language: en
Pages: 17
Authors: Alexander Elbittar
Categories:
Type: BOOK - Published: 2008 - Publisher:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Collusion in Uniform-price Auctions
Language: en
Pages: 56
Authors: Gautam Goswami
Categories: Equilibrium (Economics)
Type: BOOK - Published: 1995 - Publisher:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Auctioning Public Assets
Language: en
Pages: 340
Authors: Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2004 - Publisher: Cambridge University Press

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public uti
Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders
Language: en
Pages: 0
Authors: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Categories:
Type: BOOK - Published: 2008 - Publisher:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform-price auctions. The present article extends this area o
Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions
Language: en
Pages: 60
Authors: Orly Sade
Categories:
Type: BOOK - Published: 2013 - Publisher:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and