Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements

Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements
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Total Pages : 158
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ISBN-10 : MINN:31951002473730B
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Book Synopsis Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements by : Clara Ponsati-Obiols

Download or read book Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements written by Clara Ponsati-Obiols and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others