Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size
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Publisher : World Bank Publications
Total Pages : 43
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Book Synopsis Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size by : S. M. Ravi Kanbur

Download or read book Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size written by S. M. Ravi Kanbur and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1991 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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